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PUBLIC SAFETY; THE UTAH 
HIGHWAY PATROL; KEN COLYAR; 
SALEM CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah; BRAD JAMES; 
SPANISH FORK CITY CORPORATION, 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah; ED ASAY; and 
Public Entities 1-3; and JOHN 
DOES 1-8, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case involves a claim for damages suffered by the 
appellant when her automobile was struck by a driver (Floyd) who 
was fleeing from a Utah Highway Patrolman. Suit was brought 
against both the State of Utah and the municipalities of Salem 
City and Spanish Fork City, and their employees. The District 
Court of Salt Lake County granted summary judgment in favor of 
all defendants on the grounds, inter alia, that §63-30-7(2) 
provided absolute immunity to the defendants from damages result-
ing from an accident caused by a fleeing driver. Summary judg-
ment was also granted the municipal defendants, because there was 
no showing that any act or omission of those defendants caused or 
contributed to the high speed pursuit and the ultimate collision. 
Plaintiff appealed and this Court affirmed (247 UAR 19) in 
all respects, holding that §63-30-7(2), Utah Code Ann., was 
constitutional and operated to bar plaintiff's claims against the 
defendant law enforcement officers and their employers. As to 
the municipal defendants, the Court also affirmed on the basis 
that "our review of the record reveals an insufficiency of 
alleged facts to establish causation on the part of the cities or 
their employees, as a matter of law," 247 UAR at 20. 
Appellant filed a Petition for Rehearing, arguing that 
§63-30-7(2) violated various constitutional rights of the plain-
tiff, that the governmental entities were not immune from suit 
under the discretionary function exception of §63-30-10, and that 
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a determination of lack of causation cannot be decided as a 
matter of law. 
As to the last point, the appellant fails to "state with 
particularity the points of law or fact which the petitioner 
claims the Court has overlooked or misapprehended . . . ", as 
required by Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
simply reargues the same points made in her original briefs. 
The municipal defendants were entitled to summary judgment 
based upon the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and well-
established principles of common law. In addition, and more 
fundamentally, the municipal defendants were entitled to summary 
judgment because the appellant simply failed to develop any 
evidence that any act or omission of those defendants caused the 
"high speed chase" and/or the collision between the fleeing 
driver and the plaintiff. Thus, regardless of whether the Court 
decides to grant the appellant's Petition for Rehearing, same 
should be granted only on the constitutional issues which relate 
peculiarly to the State defendants and the Petition should be 
denied as to the municipal defendants. 
Accordingly, the municipal appellees incorporate by refer-
ence and adopt the arguments set forth in the State's Response to 
the Petition for Rehearing as they relate to Points I, II, III 
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and IV of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing.1 The municipal 
appellees will thus respond only to the causation argument set 
forth in Point V of Appellant's Petition. 
LACK OF CAUSATION WAS PROPERLY DETERMINED 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Petitioner's fundamental complaint is that it was inappro-
priate for the Court to conclude that the municipal defendants 
could not be liable because Floyd "simply went around the muni-
cipal officer's vehicles, did not see them again after passing 
them prior to the collision, and was attempting at all times 
during the pursuit to elude only Trooper Colyar" (247 UAR 20), 
and complains (without citation of authority) that same was 
improper under Utah law. 
It must be kept in mind that the plaintiff does not claim 
that the police officers themselves ran into her vehicle. Her 
fundamental complaint is that a high speed chase was initiated 
and continued under circumstances where it was unreasonable to do 
so and it was foreseeable that Floyd would, while fleeing from 
the police, drive in an even more reckless fashion and collide 
with some innocent third party. The negligence on the part of 
the police officer would, obviously, have to consist of some 
1These appellees would, however, venture the observation that 
none of the cases cited by appellant stand for the proposition 
that, at common law, an officer could be liable for the reckless 
acts of a fleeing miscreant. Our forefathers, unaccustomed to the 
recent trend of expanding tort liability, would likely have been 
astonished by the notion that the policeman should pay for injuries 
caused by the lawbreaker. 
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overt affirmative act, such as turning on his lights and sirens 
and chasing the fleeing driver, all of which thus presumably 
motivates him to drive yet faster and more recklessly. One could 
hardly make such a claim against a police officer whose police 
car was only observed parked by the side of the road, even if the 
mere presence of that police officer made the fleeing suspect 
nervous, for in that instance there would be nothing that the 
officer could do to avoid liability other than to suddenly make 
himself and his police car invisible. Surely, neither the law, 
public policy, nor common sense would impose even the potential 
of liability on the officer for merely being in the neighborhood 
when the fleeing driver drove by. Yet, that is essentially what 
the Petitioner argues as against these defendants. 
There is no dispute that the only thing that Floyd knew 
about Officers Brad James and Ed Asay was that he drove past 
their police cars, leaving them behind and never to be seen by 
him again. Granted, the officers made their presence known by 
activating their overhead lights, but Floyd did not know that 
they did anything more than that. Floyd was fleeing no one other 
than the highway patrolman, although at the end of the chase he 
was also being pursued by a Utah County Sheriff's vehicle.2 
20ddly, plaintiff has not seen fit to sue the County, even 
though its involvement was much more direct than that of the 
municipalities. 
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Petitioner's attempt to impose liability on the municipal 
officers is both nonsensical and contrary to Petitioner's funda-
mental theory in this case; that is, that to chase someone and 
cause them to flee under some circumstances may impose liability 
because the danger of the fleeing driver colliding with a third 
person is foreseeable. Floyd knew that the highway patrolman was 
pursuing him, and he was fleeing accordingly. He did not know 
that the municipal officers were pursuing him, he was not trying 
to evade them, and nothing that the municipal officers did, or 
didn't do, influenced his conduct in any way whatsoever. Indeed, 
petitioner's attempt to hold those officers liable smacks of 
overreaching. 
The only authorities cited by Petitioner are cases from 
Florida, Maryland and Michigan, each of which is factually 
distinguishable, and legally irrelevant. 
Brown v. City of Pinellas Park, 557 So.2d 161 (Fla. App. 2 
Dist. 1990), involved a number of officers in active pursuit 
(described as a "speeding caravan"), where it would be impossible 
to draw any distinctions as to how the fleeing driver was react-
ing to any particular pursuing police vehicle. 
The Maryland case, Boyer v. State, 594 A.2d 121 (1991), 
involved a high speed chase initiated by a highway patrolman 
joined by a number of sheriff's deputies. There was no discus-
sion of the exact involvement of the deputies. The Court held 
only that, as a legal matter, the State and County officers might 
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be held liable if indeed negligence was established on remand; it 
does not stand for the proposition that causation may not be 
determined as a matter of law on undisputed facts. 
Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor, 339 N.W.2d 413 (Mich. 1983), 
held that the involved officers might be liable if after remand 
it were determined that their pursuit of the fleeing driver was 
negligent. In that case, the officers in the first police car 
observed the suspect commit a traffic violation and thereupon 
initiated and continued a lengthy high speed pursuit. The flee-
ing driver lost control of his car and it came to a stop. While 
one of the first officers was approaching his car, he sped off. 
A few moments later he was observed and chased by another police 
officer who had heard of the first chase over the radio. While 
the second chase was under way, the accident occurred involving 
the plaintiff. In the instant case, of course, Officers James 
and Asay neither initiated the initial pursuit, nor was the flee-
ing driver attempting to elude them at the time of the accident. 
Fiser thus does not support Petitioner's argument.3 
It is abundantly clear from the uncontradicted testimony of 
Floyd himself that his conduct was in no way influenced by the 
mere presence of the police cars driven by Officers James and 
3Indeed, Fiser held that an officer who did not personally 
operate either of the vehicles involved in the high speed chase 
could not be held liable as a matter of law. 
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Asay.4 Since the fundamental operative facts of this case are 
undisputed, it is clearly appropriate for the Court to enter 
summary judgment in favor of a party whose acts have not been 
shown to be the cause of the harm complained of. This fundamen-
tal proposition is well recognized in Utah. Apache Tank Lines, 
Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985); Jensen v. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel Company, 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980); see also 
White v. Deseelhorst, 245 UAR 4 (S.C. 8/16/94) (recognizing that 
summary judgment may be appropriate on the issue of causation if 
facts are undisputed). Plaintiff cites no authority to the 
contrary. In absence of causation, both factual and legally 
(proximately), there can be no negligence action, Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of the case are undisputed and the law is settled. 
This Court did not overlook or misapprehend any significant 
factual or legal issue, the Court's opinion is correct in all 
respects, and the appellant's Petition for Rehearing should be 
denied. 
Reference should be made to these defendants' main brief at 
pages 2-7, setting forth verbatim the relevant portions of Floyd's 
testimony. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2^ day of EksMt*^ 1994 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By f A J U ^ A 
Allan £mG4 r s °P^ 
Anne Swens* 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Salem City Corporation, Spanish 
Fork City Corporation, Brad 
James and Ed Asay 
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